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Anthony Reid
The establishment of a Republican government in Sumatra, between 
August and October 1945, was the result of an autonomous revolution, 
or series of revolutions, which echoed the revolutionary process in 
Java, but were quite distinct from it. The central Republican 
government had virtually no direct means of control over Sumatra 
until April 1946, when a delegation under the Defense Minister 
Amir Sjarifuddin toured the island. The teams of pemuda (youth) 
propagandists sent from Djakarta by Sjarifuddin in September formed 
an earlier direct link, but they do not appear to have reached West 
Sumatra until the end of October, and North Sumatra until November.1 
The desire on the part of the pemuda in Sumatra to imitate what 
little they knew of the Javanese example was a compelling one, but 
it was spontaneous and uncontrolled.
The autonomous nature of the early months of revolution in 
Sumatra makes it necessary to give the matter some separate atten­
tion. The excellent work on the early revolution in Java by Kahin, 
Smail, Anderson, Hatta, and the Waseda University team of Nishijima, 
Kishi, and Hayashi2 has already made the general scenario familiar,
1. The Sumatran commander, General Tanabe, testified that these 
pemuda landed in South Sumatra in early September. Rijksinstituut 
voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Indisch Collectie (hereafter abbreviated 
as I.C.), 059351. However,they appear to turn up first in 
Palembang only on October 1, in West Sumatra on October 30, and
in Atjeh about November 25. Kementerian Penerangan, Republik 
Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Selatan (Djakarta: n.p., 1954), 
p. 41. Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia Propinsi 
Sumatera Tengah (Djakarta: n.p., n .d.), pp. 94-95. Semangat 
Merdeka (KutaTadja), November 27, 1945.
2. G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1952) ; John R. W~. Smail, Bandung in 
the Early Revolution 1945-1946: A study in the Social History
of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1964); Benedict R. O'G. And'erson, Some Aspects of 
Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 
(Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961) , and "The 
Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics, 1945-1946" (unpublished 
thesis, Cornell University, 1967; Waseda Daigaku, Tokyo, Okuma 
Memorial Social Sciences Research Center (team led by Nishijima), 
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (Washington: U.S. 
Dept. of Commerce, Clearing House for Federal Scientific and 
Technical Information, Joint Publications Research Service, 1963); 
Mohammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Djakarta: 
Tintamas, 1969).
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but the political balance among the actors was quite different. 
Most notably, the official Republican leadership was very much 
weaker in relation first to the Allies and later to the pemuda 
activists.
Japanese Policies
A major effect of the Japanese occupation of Sumatra was to 
decapitate all organizational activity there. On the one hand, 
the connection with Java was totally severed to insulate Sumatra, 
as far as possible, from the relatively advanced political climate 
of Java. On the other hand, as we will consider at the end of this 
section, organizational contact even within Sumatra above the 
residency level was made very difficult until the last six months 
of the occupation.
Early in the occupation a clear distinction was observable 
between Japanese planning for Java, and for the rest of Indonesia. 
Java, which was under the 16th Army, was considered capable of 
making political progress. The relatively sparsely populated 
islands of Borneo, Celebes, and the Lesser Sundas, administered by 
the Japanese Navy, were to be ’’retained in future for the benefit of 
the Empire.”3 Malaya and Sumatra, united under the 25th Army, were 
described as ’’the nuclear zone of the Empire’s plans for the 
Southern Area,”4 5because of their strategic importance as well as 
their economic value as sources of oil, rubber, and tin. According 
to a Japanese policy statement of April 1942, Malaya and Sumatra 
were ultimately to revert to Japan, and as late as December 1942 a 
high Japanese official saluted the inhabitants of Penang as "the new 
Japanese people.”6 Thus the Japanese permitted no talk of inde­
pendence in Sumatra, nor any other political activity except 
propaganda for immediate Japanese purposes. All Indonesian 
political organizations there were suppressed within a few weeks 
of the Japanese occupation.
Only after April 1943, when Sumatra was separated from Malaya 
administratively, was there some reconsideration of this policy in 
light of the worsening war situation. But the 25th Army, which now 
administered Sumatra alone, consistently fought against any conces­
sions in the direction of independence there and took the limited 
steps it did only reluctantly, under pressure from Tokyo or their 
more hard-pressed colleagues in Java. As General Shimura, who 
guided the Sumatra administration from January 1944, said:
3. Army-Navy Agreement, November 26, 1941, in Benda, Irikura, and 
Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: 
Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia 
Studies” 1965) , p . 7. Also ibid., p. 29.
4. Instructions on the administration of Malaya and Sumatra, April 
1942, in ibid., p. 169.
5. Ibid., p. 169.
6. Penang Shimbun, December 19, 1942.
23
Little effort was made in this direction [independence] 
in Sumatra, prior to May 1945, as the demand for 
independence was not nearly so strong as in Java.
The opinion of the Japanese Army officials in 
Sumatra was that the people of that country were 
not sufficiently developed, socially and culturally, 
to take on themselves the responsibilities of self- 
government. They therefore approached the task in 
a "half-hearted manner.”7
The commander in Sumatra, General Tanabe, insofar as he deigned to 
notice Indonesian politics at all, endorsed ShimuraTs picture.
Before the Japanese capitulation there was really 
little question of an Indonesian Independence move­
ment, and very certainly not of help from the side 
of the Japanese military Government. . . . What 
this independence should consist of was not clear 
to me, probably something different to Manchukuo 
since the institution of a Volksraad is not known 
there. I must remark here that I have never been 
interested in politics, and thus I know little 
about it.8
At the first Imperial Conference on the question of Indonesian 
future in May 1943, the 25th Army opposed any meaningful concessions, 
while the 16th Army in Java pressed for a commitment to independence. 
The compromise agreed upon was that no part of Indonesia would be 
permitted independence, but political participation could be granted 
to Java at once and other areas in accordance with their readiness.9 
In Java this led to the rapid establishment of advisory councils 
in each residency, surmounted by the Central Advisory Council for 
all Java headed by Sukarno. Java-wide movements had already been 
founded or sanctioned early in 1943 as vehicles for the nationalist 
politicians (Putera, to be followed by Jawa Hokdkai), and for the 
Muslims (MIAI, to be followed by Masjumi). Thus a Java-wide 
Indonesian leadership was to a considerable extent encouraged by the 
16th Army. Its power was contained by balancing nationalists, Muslims 
and pamong pradja (bureaucracy) against each other at the all-Java 
level, rather than by regional checks.
In Sumatra the Japanese reluctantly agreed to the establishment 
of regional advisory councils {Shu Sangi Kai) in each of the ten 
residencies in November 1943. The councils met only twice a year 
to consider a politically innocuous list of questions submitted by 
the Japanese chokan (resident). In those residencies which were
7. Interrogation of General Shimura, I. C. 009403. Also I. J.
Brugmans, H. J. de Graaf, A. H. Joustra, and A. G. Vromans (eds.), 
Nederlandsch-IndiS onder Japanse Bezetting: Gegevens en
documenten over de jaren 1942-1945 (Francker: "TVever, 1960), p. 584.
8. Interrogation of General Tanabe, I. C. 059351.
9. Nishijima, ejt. aJ. , Japanese Military Administration, pp. 122-124 
and 372. Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Japanese Military Administra­
tion , pp. 237-240.
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considered potentially explosive, the Japanese were careful to bal­
ance the representation of pergerakan (popular movement, both 
political and religious) against that of the pamong pradja and 
keradjaan (traditional rulers).10 At about the same time propaganda 
organizations began to be set up in some residencies as a means of 
controlling the erstwhile politicians and Muslim reformers of the 
pergerakan and using them as a counterweight to the administrative 
authority of the keradjaan.11 In Palembang, Lampung, West Sumatra, 
Tapanuli, and Atjeh, these sectional organizations were dissolved 
into a broader Hokokai, or Badan Kebaktian Rakjat (People's Loyalty 
Organization) in early 1945. These later organizations were 
modelled on the Djawa Hokokai headed by Sukarno, with the same 
double purpose of diluting the pergerakan while providing a broader 
front against the approaching Allies.12 They differed from the 
Javanese.model, however, in that like all other Indonesian organiza­
tions in Sumatra they were strictly confined to the residency 
level.
The deteriorating Japanese military position during 1944 
necessitated a revision of the May 1943 policy for Indonesia, with 
the result that Premier Koiso publicly promised on September 7,
1944 eventual independence of the East Indies. Although the ter­
ritorial limits of the future state remained undecided because of 
objections by the Navy as well as the 25th Army, it was decided 
that Sumatra as well as Java would immediately be permitted to use 
the national Indonesian flag and anthem already popularized before 
the war.13 14 Mainly for this reason, the Koiso statement did have 
considerable impact in Sumatra, in marked contrast to previous 
Japanese concessions.1 * But despite the extensive use of these
10. Nishijima, et. al., Japanese Military Administration, pp. 171- 
172. Kita-Sumatora-sinbun (Medan), November 11, 1943. This 
balance was particularly necessary in Atjeh, East Sumatra, and 
West Sumatra, as all of those residencies had experienced ten­
sions between the two groups at the time of the Japanese invasion
11. The East Sumatran body, formed on November 28, 1943, was known 
as BOMPA (Badan Oentoek Membantu Pertahanan Asia). In Atjeh 
Maibkatra (Madjelis agama Islam untuk bantuan kemakmuran Asia 
Timur Raja di Atjeh) had been established for Muslim leaders in 
March 1943. Tapanuli had its Bapen (Badan Pertahanan Negeri) 
and West Sumatra its Giyugun Koen-Kai. The suspicion of all 
politicians in Palembang following mass arrests in September 
1943 evidently prevented the formation of such a body there.
12. Kita-Sumatora-sinbun, November 26, 2063 [1943]. Kementerian 
Penerangan, Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Utara (Djakarta: 
n.p., 19 53) , p. 7T. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera 
Tengah, pp. 79-80. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, 
pp. 33-34. A. J. Piekaar, AtjSh en de oorlog met Japan (The 
Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1949) , pp. 205-206 and 240-241.
13. Nishijima, et. al. , Japanese Military Administration, pp. 373-380 
642-644; Bencfa, Irikura, and Kishi, Japanese Military Adminis­
tration , pp. 240-262.
14. Hadji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah [Hamka], Kenang-kenangan Hidup 
(2nd ed.; Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1966), pp. 239-244. Dr. 
Amir's notes, June 14, 1946, I. C. 005964.
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"Indonesian" symbols for propaganda purposes, the 25th Army continued 
to insist that Sumatra follow a separate path from Java. At the 
same time it delayed as long as possible any transfer of responsi­
bilities to Indonesians.
The initial 16th Army plan in January 1945 for a Body for the 
Investigation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penjelidik Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia, or BPKI) was that it should comprise "influential 
residents of Java and Sumatra."15 This would have provided the first 
opportunity for Sumatran leaders to consult with their more advanced 
colleagues in Java. However, no delegates from Sumatra were included 
when the BPKI composition was announced on April 29, presumably 
because of opposition from the Sumatra command. In the same vein 
General Shimura repeatedly refused permission for Sukarno to visit 
Sumatra because he feared that "the independence movement might get 
out of hand and not follow the path prescribed for it by the Japanese 
authorities."16 From early 1945, however, higher military authorities 
were convinced that Sumatra would have to be included in a credible 
Indonesian state. At a series of hasty meetings held in Tokyo and 
Singapore between April and July 1945 to clarify Japanese policy, 
the 25th Army's misgivings were repeatedly overruled, and it was 
instructed to make rapid preparations for Indonesian independence.17 
But Tokyo conceded that although the independence of the whole former 
East Indies would be declared at one time:
Those areas which have not completed preparations shall 
gradually be transferred to the jurisdiction of the new 
independent nation in accordance with the progress of 
independence preparations.18
At least as late as June 1945, Sumatran leaders appeared to be under­
standably unsure whether the old slogan, Sumatera Baru (New Sumatra), 
or the new one, Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia), more accurately 
represented Japanese plans for them.19
Besides sealing Sumatra off altogether from Java, the Japanese 
also made regular contact between residencies within Sumatra extremely 
difficult. Until the last two months of the occupation, all 
Japanese-sponsored organizations were strictly confined to the 
residency level, and the few nonpolitical prewar organizations 
like Mohammadiah and Taman Siswa found contact beyond this level 
virtually impossible. Moreover, wartime conditions made communication.
15. Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Japanese Military Administration, p. 263.
16. Interrogation of General Shimura, I. C. 009405.
17. Interrogation of General Tanabe, I. C. 059351, and General Hamada,
I. C. 059353. Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Japanese Military 
Administration, pp. 265-274.
18. Decision of Supreme War Guidance Council, July 17, 1945, in Benda, 
Irikura, and Kishi, Japanese Military Administration, p. 274.
19. See for example the speeches hailing the Sumatra Chuo Sangi In 
in Kita-Sumatora-sinbun, June 27, 2605 [1945],
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extremely difficult for Indonesians even on a personal or commercial 
basis. The only opportunities leaders of various regions had to 
compare notes came during the Syonan (Singapore) Islamic Conference 
in April 1943, the journeys of various delegations to Japan during 
1943, and the elaborate ceremonies in Bukittinggi in October 1944 
to "receive" the Koiso promise.20 These gatherings contributed 
little to the emergence of a Sumatra-wide leadership because of the 
stifling political control maintained by the Japanese in Sumatra.
For example, the Atjehnese Teuku Muhamad Hasan from Glumpang Pajong, 
appointed leader of the Sumatran delegation to Japan in the second 
half of 1943,' was arrested and executed a few months after his 
return.21
This horizontal fragmentation notwithstanding, the differences 
between Japanese and Dutch divide-and-rule policies are more instruc­
tive than the parallels so stimulatingly drawn by Anderson.22 The 
Dutch colonial system in practice was highly centralized and sub­
jected the Indonesian elite to economic, educational, legal, and 
administrative pressures which were all centripetal. Dutch 
strategies were based on Indonesia-wide calculations, whereby the 
growing power of the nationally-oriented urban intelligentsia was 
to be balanced by the encouragement of local political loyalties 
and concerns. They found ready support for this strategy among 
Indonesians resentful of the pace of centralization and suspicious 
of the larger or more advanced ethnic groups with which it brought 
them into contact. Japanese administration, on the other hand, was 
essentially fragmented. There was scarcely any coordination between 
the army and the navy, and not a great deal even between the 16th 
and 25th Armies. Even within Sumatra communication difficulties 
and the stress on economic self-sufficiency in each residency made 
it necessary for each Japanese chokan to find his own solutions. 
Regional division became an objective fact, and the significant 
Japanese policies were framed at the residency level. Rather than 
balancing regional loyalties against each other or Java, the 
Japanese exploited wherever necessary the divisions within the 
residency, typically between the pergerakan and the keradjaan. This 
policy had serious consequences in the violent post-surrender con­
frontation of these balanced forces in several residencies, notably 
Atjeh and East Sumatra. But from the standpoint of Indonesian unity, 
the results of three years of Japanese rule were on balance positive. 
Almost every social and ethnic group in Sumatra was irked by the 
extreme isolation of the Japanese period. Only those with long 
memories were particularly conscious of ethnic and regional sus­
picions at the war's end. The enthusiasm of youth for unity 
above all was heightened by the fact they had never had the oppor­
tunity to enjoy it.
20. Atjeh Sinbun (Kutaradja), November 7-14, 2604 [1944].
21. Piekaar, Atjbh, pp. 214, and 231-232.
22. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Japan: 'The Light of Asia,'" in 
Josef Silverstein (ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II:
Four Essays (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 
1966) , p. 17.
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Preparation for Independence
The first concession towards allowing the development of politi­
cal leadership above the residency level in Sumatra was the announce­
ment on March 24, 1945 that a Sumatran Central Advisory Council 
(Chuo Sangi In) would at last be set up--almost two years after that 
of Java. Fifteen members were elected by the ten regional advisory 
councils, and on May 17 the Japanese command in Bukittinggi appointed 
an additional twenty-five members. As usual, a careful balance was 
preserved b'etween representatives of opposing groups in the key 
residencies.23 At the end of May the Gunseikanbu (military adminis­
tration) in Bukittinggi announced its appointees. Mohammad Sjafei,24 
founder of the experimental school at Kaju Tanam, West Sumatra, was 
appointed chairman of the forthcoming Central Advisory Council, with 
T. Nja'k Arif25 of Atjeh and Mr. Abdul Abbas26 27 of Lampung as vice- 
chairman. A substantial permanent secretariat for the Council was 
established, headed by the leading Sumatran journalist, Djamaluddin 
Adinegoro,22 who moved from Medan to Bukittinggi and resigned his
23. See appendix for the composition of the Chuo Sangi In.
24. Engku Mohammad Sjafei (1901-1969), adopted son of a prominent 
Minangkabau teacher and writer, Marah Soetan, was educated in 
the Bukittinggi teachers' college. Subsequently in Batavia, and 
in Europe (1922-1924), he was especially drawn to the study of 
painting and educational theory. In 1926 he founded his Indische 
Nationale School (I.N.S.) for teachers in Kaju Tanam, West Sumatra, 
where the curriculum stressed self-expression and the arts and 
attempted to embody specifically Indonesian values. Politically 
Sjafei was associated with Indische Partij/Insulinde before 
visiting Europe and Hatta's PNI-baru thereafter. He was chairman 
of the West Sumatra Shu Sangi Kai (1943-1945) and Hokokai (1945), 
the first Republican resident of West Sumatra (1945), and was 
later named Minister of Education (June-October 1946).
25. Teuku Njak Arif (1900-1946), educated at the Bukittinggi Teachers' 
College and the OSVIA in Serang, was the Panglima Sagi of the 
XXVI Mukims in Atjeh Besar. He established himself as the most 
prominent Atjehnese nationalist during his period in the 
Volksraad (1927-1931). Despite his uncompromising opposition to 
some aspects of the Japanese regime, he was recognized by 1943
as the principal Atjehnese spokesman. He was the Republican 
resident of Atjeh until he was removed during the anti-uleSbalang 
action of December 1945.
26. Mr. Abdul Abbas, of Mandailing origin, obtained his law degree in 
Holland. He was the prewar Parindr.a leader in Lampung and became 
Chairman of the Lampung Shu Sangi Kai, and first Republican 
resident of Lampung until he was "daulat"-ed by the pemuda in 
September 1946.
27. Djamaluddin Adinegoro (1903-?) was given the former name, but 
adopted the latter. Born in Sawahlunto, the son of a District 
Chief, he was closely related to both Dr. Amir and Muhammad Yamin. 
He studied medicine in Batavia (STOVIA) and journalism in Munich 
(1925-1929). From 1931 he was chief editor of the leading 
Indonesian daily in Sumatra, Pewarta Deli, and for many years a 
member of the Medan gemeenteraad (city council). He was the only
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elected seat in the council. These four men were built up in the 
Japanese-controlled press during June and July as the Em-pat 
Serangkai of Sumatra, comparable with the Sukarno-Hatta-Ki Hadjar 
Dewantoro-K.H.M. Mansur team in Java.28
The Japanese prepared an agenda of questions for the Central 
Advisory Council concerning means of strengthening the unity and 
resolve of Sumatrans in the Greater East Asia War.29 But the ques­
tions were framed generally enough to permit the braver members to 
voice some of their demands for more educational opportunities, lower 
prices, and'further progress towards independence. After meeting 
from June 27 to July 2, the Council passed a series of resolutions 
calling for further institutions at the all-Sumatra level, notably:
(1) a preparatory committee for independence; (2) a Sumatera 
Hokokai, linking the residency propaganda organizations; (3) a 
higher -Islamic college; (4) a liaison office to link the residency 
People's Guidance Bureaus; (5) a national banking system; and (6) a 
strong "people's army" (lasjkar rakjat) built on the foundation of 
the Japanese-trained Giyugun (army volunteers) and Heiho (military 
auxiliaries). Dr. Gani called for a minimum strength of 500,000 
men.30 The newspaper reports of speeches and resolutions suggested 
a continuing uncertainty at the meeting between Sumatera Baru and 
Indonesia Merdeka. On the other hand Hamka holds in retrospect:
There the spirit of unity was firm. There the spirit 
of wanting to divide Sumatra from a united Indonesia 
was clearly opposed.31
The Japanese appear to have indicated their readiness to imple­
ment all the resolutions of the Council.32 They did announce the 
formation of a separate Sumatran Committee to Investigate the Prepara 
tion of Independence (Panitia Penjelidik Persiapan Kemerdekaan) with 
a heavy weighting of intellectuals calculated to bridge the gulf 
between pergerakan and keradjaan.33 They also made a cautious start
resident Sumatran in a potential Indonesian Cabinet presented 
to the Japanese in March 1942 by the leading nationalist parties. 
The Japanese appointed him editor of the Sumatera-sinbun (later 
Kita-Sumatora-sinbun) and vice-chairman of the East Sumatra Shu 
Sangi Kai. Atjeh STnbun, May 29 , 2605 [1945]; Nishijima, et.. al. 
Japanese Military Administration, p. 342.
28. Ali Hasjmy, in Atjeh Sinbun, July 24, 2605 [1945].
29. Atjeh Sinbun, June 28, 2605 [1945].
30. Ibid., June 29, July 3, and July 31, 2605 [1945]; Penang Shimbun, 
July 11, 1945.
31. Nishijima, ejt. aJ. , Japanese Military Administration, p. 263.
32. Penang Shimbun, July 11, 1945.
33. Atjeh Sinbun, July 28, 2605 [1945].• For the membership of this 
body, which never met, see Appendix.
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towards establishing a unified Islamic movement by extending the West 
Sumatran Madjelis Islam Tinggi (Supreme Islamic Conference) to other 
residencies,31* and appointed Sjech Mohammad Djamil Djambek adviser on 
Islamic affairs for all Sumatra.34 5 But all such cautious moves 
were rapidly overtaken by the rush of events in August.
The last-minute attempts to create a Sumatran leadership were 
significant. Sjafei and Adinegoro headed an embryo Sumatra bureau­
cracy with contacts throughout the island, and the press made their 
names familiar in every residency. On July 25 they were also 
appointed chairman and secretary respectively of the Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation of Independence, and on the following 
day they began a speechmaking tour of Sumatra.36 In the closing 
months of the occupation the Japanese seem also to have recognized 
Dr. A. K. Gani's position as the only national-level prewar politician 
in Sumatra,37 although he had been arrested and tortured during the 
razzia of September 1943. Hamka points out that at the Central 
Advisory Council it was the unofficial gatherings of leaders from 
different districts which were most important in establishing a 
unified approach to the problem of independence. In such gatherings, 
"M. Sjafei was recognized quite apart from his recognition by the 
Japanese as the leader to be put forward."38 Hamka also considered 
Dr. A. K. Gani, T. Njak Arif, and Dr. Ferdinand Lumbantobing to have 
achieved positions of acknowledged leadership as a result of their
34. E.g. to Riau in May 1945; At)eh Sinbun, May 31, 2605 [1945]. The 
Madjelis Islam Tinggi in Bukittinggi continued this role after 
the proclamation, and succeeded in holding an all-Sumatra Islamic 
conference in December 1945.
35. Atjeh Sinbun, May 29, 2605 [1945].
36. Ibid., July 19, 1945; Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera 
Selatan. p. 35. The plan was for a two-month tour of Sumatra 
from South to North, but the only major center they reached 
before the surrender was Palembang on August 1-4 where their 
visit gave rise to a local independence investigating committee.
37. General Shimura stated that Sjafei, Adinegoro, and Gani "were 
the Sumatrans' leaders in all negotiations with the Japanese,"
I. C. 009402. Dr. Adnan Kapau Gani (1909-1968), a Minangkabau, 
studied medicine in Djakarta. He was founder and chairman of 
Gerindo, the major socialist party (1937-1941), and secretary
of the political federation Gapi (1941). He moved from Djakarta 
to Palembang in 1940. The Japanese initially distrusted him, 
presumably because of his association with Amir Sjarifuddin, and 
imprisoned him for several months in 1943. He rapidly returned 
to prominence after the Koiso statement, as chairman of the 
Palembang Shu Sangi Kai, deputy to the Japanese chokan, and 
eventually the first Republican resident in Palembang. He 
entered the Republican Cabinet as economic minister in October, 
1946, and was deputy premier in 1947.
38. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan Hidup, p. 262.
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strongly nationalist stand.
Inexplicably, the Japanese abandoned the leaders they had been 
developing when they appointed Sumatra’s delegates to the Panitia 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence--PPKI) in early August. Mr. Abdul Abbas 
was one of the delegates, but the other two were Medan intellectuals 
who had not even been members of the Central Advisory Council-- 
Dr. Mohammad Amir39 401 and Mr. T. M. Hasan.1,0 It seems possible that 
the Japanese planners in Singapore or Djakarta distrusted the 
leadership developed by the intransigeant 25th Army as too distinctly 
Sumatran, or too much the creatures of the Gunseikan.91 But on 
either count the most logical appointee would have been Dr. Gani. 
Whatever the reason, the consequences were more serious than anyone 
would have expected.
The three Sumatran delegates arrived in Djakarta on August 14, in 
the same Japanese bomber as Sukarno and Hatta. They remained to 
witness the dramatic proclamation of independence following the 
Japanese surrender and to play their part in establishing a consti­
tution and a government. Both Amir and Hasan expressed their fears
39. Dr. Mohammad Amir (1900-1949), another Minangkabau, studied 
medicine in Batavia (STOVIA, 1918-1923) and Utrecht (1924-1928), 
specializing in psychiatry. From his student days he was a 
prominent essayist and an editor of Jong Sumatra (1917-1922) 
and later Penindj auan. He appears not to have been a party
man after the failureof the moderate Partai Rakjat Indonesia 
in 1930, though sympathizing with Parindra. Like many Indo- 
nesian intellectuals he was attracted to the theosophist move­
ment in the 1920's, but became more involved than most, and 
married the daughter of Ir. Fournier, the leading Dutch 
theosophist in Java. He lived in Medan from 1934 and from 
1937 was personal physician to the Sultan of Langkat. He appears 
to have been valued by the Japanese because of his links with 
both pergerakan and keradjaan and because his Dutch wife made 
him especially vulnerable. He was appointed minister without 
portfolio in Sukarno's first cabinet, and deputy-governor of 
Sumatra from December 1945 until his defection from the Republic 
the following April.
40. Teuku Mohammad Hasan (born 1906), eldest son of the uleSbalang 
of Pineueng, in the PidiS district of Atjeh, obtained his law 
degree from Leiden (1933). From 1936 he was attached to the 
commission investigating administrative decentralization in the 
outer islands, and in 1938 transferred to the new office of 
governor of Sumatra in Medan. Studious and devout, his relations 
with Medan ulama were good, though he was not completely trusted 
by the Atjehnese PUSA. During the Japanese occupation he was 
concerned mainly with rice production and distribution, but be­
came a confidant of the East Sumatra chokan during 1944-1945 and 
was eventually appointed Koseikyokucho (head of bureau dealing 
with petitions).
41. Dr. Amir stated that Yamaguchi, head of political affairs in 
Sumatra, was piqued that the choice of delegates had been made 
in Singapore or Djakarta without reference to the 25th Army;
I. C. 005966. On the other hand Republik Indonesia Propinsi 
Sumatera Tengah. p. 83, claims it was the 25th Army who obstructed 
Sjafei's departure for the PPKI.
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of Javanese centralism in the PPKI debates, Amir pleading:
that the maximum decentralization be allowed for the 
islands outside Java, that governments be set up there 
and that the people there be given the right to manage 
their domestic affairs to the widest extent.1,2
On August 19 the PPKI debated the structure of provincial government, 
and decided that Sumatra would constitute one province under one 
governor, dismissing the arguments of several members that the size 
and diversity of Sumatra necessitated three separate provinces, as 
in Java, or at least three deputy-governors in Medan, Bukittinggi, 
and Palembang. As Sumatran representative on the subcommittee which 
had met the previous night to settle these matters, Dr. Amir was 
able to secure the appointment of Mr. T. M. Hasan as governor and 
Medan as the capital. Hasan's prewar experience in the office of 
the Sumatran governor was the principal reason advanced for his 
selection, though the importance of Atiehnese support for the 
Republic cannot have been overlooked.^ The third and final session 
of the PPKI on August 22 established the Partij Nasional Indonesia 
(PNI) as the state party, Komit£ Nasional Indonesia (KNI) at various 
levels as representative councils, and the Badan Keamanan Rakjat 
(BKR) as the armed force of the Republic.I,lf The following day the 
three Sumatran delegates flew to Palembang on one of the last 
Japanese flights permitted by the Allies, with instructions to 
implement these decisions in Sumatra in cooperation with Sjafei 
and Adinegoro. Dr. Gani was specifically instructed to organize 
the PNI and Mr. Abbas the KNI in Sumatra. **5 Hasan as governor would 
appoint Republican residents, who would attempt to take the initia­
tive in government from the Japanese.
The Obstacles
The task of the three returning delegates was a formidable one. 
The preparation for independence by the Japanese had been minimal 
in comparison with Java, and what there was had been centered in 
Bukittinggi. Mr. Hasan in particular had no reputation outside 4235
42. Muhammad Yamin (ed.), Naskah persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 
(Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959) , I, 410 and 419. I have here 
translated from the seemingly more coherent text in Iwa Kusuma 
Sumantri, Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1963),
p. 132. Dr. Amir's importance in stressing the need for a rapid 
independence proclamation is emphasized by Hatta, Sekitar 
Proklamasi, pp. 21-22.
43. Yamin, Naskah persiapan, I, 439-440, 450-453; Hatta, Sekitar 
Proklamasi, pp. 61-62. Interviews.
44. Koesnodiprodjo (ed.), Himpunan undang2, peraturan2, penetapan2, 
pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 1945 (Djakarta: Seno, 1951) ,
pp. 117-120.
45. Dr. Amir's notes, June 14, 1946, I. C. 005966; Republik Indonesia
" ‘ ;i Sumatra Selatan, p. 37; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan Hidup^
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Medan and Atjeh, and in establishing his headquarters in Medan he 
had to make a fresh start altogether. The various residencies 
remained isolated from each other, and within many of them exist­
ing social divisions had been exacerbated by the Japanese to the 
point where no cohesive action was possible.
To take advantage of these relative weaknesses on the side of 
the Republic, the Dutch presence was established earlier and more 
energetically in Medan than elsewhere in Java or Sumatra. An Anglo- 
Dutch Country Section (ADCS) of Force 136 was formed in Colombo early 
in 1945 and parachuted three small commando units into North Sumatra 
at the end of June. Their task was to gather information and make 
contacts which might be useful in Mountbatten's projected invasion 
of Malaya on September 9. A fourth unit, led by Naval Lieutenant 
Brondgeest, and like the others overwhelmingly Dutch in composi­
tion, landed near Pangkalan Brandan on August 25. At the end of 
August all of these units received instructions to leave their 
bivouacs and contact the local Japanese commands in Kutaradja,
Rantau Prapat, Bagan Siapiapi, and Medan, respectively, in order 
to ensure the welfare of Allied prisoners of war and internees.1*6 
By September 1 Brondgeest was established in Medan's leading hotel, 
whence he made contact not only with the Japanese, but with the 
Sultans of Langkat and Deli and other prominent Indonesians who, 
while demanding some reforms, promised to cooperate with the 
Dutch.
Brondgeest quickly formed the opinion that little could be 
expected from either the British or Japanese, but that by acting 
independently with the support of local Ambonese and Menadonese 
the Dutch officers could control Medan and check any large-scale 
Republican movement until Dutch troops could land. Through his 
Dutch superior in ADCS, Admiral Helfrich, he obtained permission 
"to organize a police force to take power into our own hands over 
as extensive as possible an area of East Sumatra."k7 On September 
14 another Dutch commando, the tough and subsequently notorious 
Lieutenant Westerling, and three Dutch sergeants were parachuted 
into Medan with 180 revolvers to train and equip this police force.
By early October Westerling appears to have commanded a tolerably 
well-armed and trained force of almost two hundred men, with some 
hundreds more ex-POWs anxious to join it if arms could be found.
The force set a watch on strategic installations such as electricity 
and water supply, and conducted regular patrols of Medan and the 
route to Belawan with a couple of commandeered Japanese armored 467
46. Tweede Kamer, Staten-Generaal, Netherlands, Enqu§te-commissie 
regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, militair beleid, terugkeer riaar 
Nederlandsch-IndiS (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij- en 
Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1956), 8A and B, 585, 590, 593, and Appendix 
p. 126; Conrad E. L. Helfrich, Mempires (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
1950), II, 237-238. Both Helfrich and the Enqu§te-commissie 
report state that Brondgeest's unit was dropped on August 15, 
but I have followed Brondgeest*s written submission to the 
Enqu§te-commissie on this.
47. Brondgeest in Engugte-commissie, p. 588.
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cars.h8 The Dutch claimed, with considerable exaggeration, that they 
controlled the city until the arrival of the British.1*9
During the first month following the Japanese surrender Allied 
radio control and air supply was much better with Sumatra than with 
Java. From August 21 leaflets began to be dropped in various parts 
of Sumatra on behalf of NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administra­
tion).50 Within a few weeks of the surrender a provisional NICA 
administration for Sumatra, under Allied military auspices, was 
formed under Dr. Beck and Resident Bruggemans, both brought from the 
Dutch camp at Rantau Prapat. On October 3 about sixty key men from 
the prewar administration were brought from the camp to Medan to begin 
in secret the reconstruction of a modified anoien regime. 51 In West 
Sumatra Resident Bosselaer went even further towards re-establishing 
a NICA administration and attempting to send official instructions to 
the demang (Indonesian district heads).52
The public announcement of the Japanese surrender on August 22 
was generally taken to mean that the old masters would return, and 
internal adjustments would have to be made accordingly. Dutch 
detainees in their camps were inundated with gifts and visits from 
Indonesian well-wishers, both genuine and opportunist. Chinese 
everywhere rejoiced at what they believed to be a victory for their 
fatherland. The keradjaan element which had lost some power and 
status at the hands of the Japanese made no secret of its hope of 
regaining both under the Dutch. The ending of the Muslim fast on 
September 7 became the occasion for many attempts to mend fences 
with outstanding pro-Dutch figures. As late as October 6, an
48. Ibid., pp. 588-594; Helfrich, Memoires, II, 237-238; Raymond 
Westerling, Challenge to Terror (London: W. Kimber, 1952), pp. 
38-50. While Helfrich states and Westerling implies a strength 
below 200 for the police force, Brondgeest claimed that the 800 
men of the 26th Indian Division landed on October 12 were ’’fewer 
than I now had at my own disposal.”
49. Helfrich, Memoires, II, 269, whose purpose was polemical, claimed 
that the force ’’completely controlled Medan and its immediate 
environs. There was peace and order.” Another Dutch commando, 
who spent four days in Medan at the beginning of October en 
route to become Allied representative in Atjeh (October 5- 
November 15), said of it, ’’The situation there was tense, but 
was controlled by a very able police commandant--Raymond 
Westerling.” ’’Contact met Atjeh,” Vrij Nederland, January 19,
1946.
50. Seksi Penerangan, Dokumentasi Komite Musjawarah Angkatan 45,
Daerah Istimewa Atjeh, Modal Revolusi 45 (Kutaradja: 1960), 
p. 28; Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Utara, p. 39.
51. EnquSte-commissie, pp. 585-586; Willem Brandt, De Gele Terreur 
(The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1946), pp. 215-219; Oostkust van 
Sumatra Instituut, Kroniek, 1941-1946 (Amsterdam: 1948), pp. 45-46, 
and 5 2 .
52. EnquSte-commissie, p. 598. Mohammad Said, Empat Belas Boelan 
Pendoedoekan Inggeris di Indonesia (Medan: Kantor Berita Antara, 
1946) , p7 32.
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estimated crowd of 30,000 attended the installation of the new 
Sultan of Deli, whose well-known skepticism of the Republic was 
apparent in the official seating arrangements.53 54
Those who had more to lose by the Dutch return were initially 
more demoralized than militant. An Indonesian doctor who had 
headed the Simelungun BOMPA branch committed suicide in Pematang 
Siantar after having been questioned by a Swiss Red Cross team.
Many others fled to other parts of Sumatra or to Java, fearing 
retribution from the enemies they had made through association 
with the Japanese. Sjafei, the pre-arranged Sumatran leader, with­
drew from his Bukittinggi office to Kaju Tanam to await develop­
ments. The vast majority of the population waited in passive hope 
that the surrender would bring an end to the terrible shortage of 
food, clothing, and medical attention. The plight of plantation 
laborers*in particular was so desperate that they would have sup­
ported anyone who could rescue them from starvation.5h
The acute social and ethnic divisions of East Sumatra made 
this a particularly difficult place for Hasan and Amir to attempt 
to establish a government. The two leaders themselves, after 
driving north from Palembang discussing the PPKI decisions with a 
handful of leaders along the way, were shaken by the reports coming 
from their own residency. Hearing in Tarutung that the sultans 
were planning to arrest all those they regarded as collaborators,
Dr. Amir feared for his life. These reports soon proved to be 
based only on some meetings among the sultans, popular leaders 
such as the communists Karim M. S. and Luat Siregar, and the 
Japanese about the preservation of order in the interregnum. 
Nevertheless Amir withdrew quietly to Tandjung Pura during September, 
despite his appointment to Sukarno’s first cabinet. To some friends 
he dismissed the whole proclamation affair in Djakarta as a 
sandiwava (play-acting).55
Far from leading the revolution, Medan lagged behind other 
centers. Although he returned to the city on August 27, Hasan 
could not get the elite group to meet until September 3. Then, and 
again two weeks later, they declined even to constitute a Komite 
Nasional because of opposition from the sultans. Real progress was 
not made until the end of September.56
53. Pewarta Deli, October 6, 1945 and interviews. Allied (British 
and Dutch) and Japanese representatives were given places of 
honor while the new Republican governor was given a front 
seat in the public section.
54. Piekaar, Atjeh, pp. 246-247; Brandt, De Gele Terreur, pp. 208-209; 
Insider [S. M. Amin], Atjeh Sepintas Lalu (Djakarta: Archapada, 
1950), pp. 5-7; RepubTik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Utara,
p. 22 Hamka, Kenarig-kenangan Hidup, pp. 270-777; RepubTik 
Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, p. 255; Abdullah Hussain, 
PerTstiwa (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1965), pp. 33-34.
55. Dr. Amir’s notes, June 14, 1946, I. C. 005967. Interviews.
56. "Pamandangan Mr. Teuku M. Hasan,” in Amanat Satoe Tahoen Merdeka 
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The slowness of Medan accentuated the problem of all-Sumatran 
leadership which some PPKI members had foreseen. Both Bukittinggi 
and Palembang felt they had as much right as Medan to lead the 
Sumatran revolution. Bukittinggi's claim rested on its leadership 
during the last months before the Japanese surrender. During August 
Adinegoro was active there cabling news and advice to key men 
throughout the island. On August 29 Sjafei acknowledged and accepted 
the independence proclamation "on behalf of the Indonesian people 
of Sumatra," while Bukittinggi pemuda formed a PRI (Pemuda Republik 
Indonesia) executive for Sumatra as well as for West Sumatra. 7
Dr. Gani's claim in Palembang rested on his nationalist creden­
tials and leadership of the PNI state party. Although Sukarno had 
suspended this state party on August 31, Sumatra became aware of this 
only much later. Gani meanwhile appointed political leaders by 
telegram to the executive of a Sumatran PNI, including such diverse 
people as the communist Karim M.S. and the Atjehnese Teuku Njak Arif. 
At the end of November the PNI was still talking of itself as a 
state party led by Sukarno, though it gained little popular momentum 
outside Gani's South Sumatra.57 8 Gani also felt that he deserved 
primacy because he had shown greater political initiative than the 
other Japanese-sanctioned leaders. When he heard officially that 
Hasan had been appointed governor, Gani sent a personal messenger 
to Sukarno protesting that "since the beginning of the revolution 
not a single report has been heard about the seizure of power in 
the north."59
It has been suggested60 that one of the reasons for the slow 
beginning of the independence movement in Sumatra was the different 
attitudes of the 25th and 16th Armies after the surrender. It is 
true that many Japanese in Sumatra were personally very skeptical 
about the chances for mevdeka and probably conveyed this mood to 
their Indonesian acquaintances. It is also true that there was no 
Admiral Maeda in Sumatra to act as protective midwife at the 
Republic's birth, although there were prominent Japanese defectors 
to the nationalist side. But it remains true that the Japanese in 
Sumatra proved as reluctant as their colleagues in Java to carry 
out Allied instructions at the expense of a clash with the 
Indonesians. General Tanabe's non-interference policy was well 
expressed in a three-point telegram to one of his officers on 
October 7:
1. The Japanese Army must take a strictly neutral atti­
tude towards the Indonesian independence movement.
2. Troop movements of the Japanese army must be directed 
mainly at the maintenance of law and order.
57. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, pp. 84-85, 500, 
and 544.
58. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, pp. 50-51, and 
189; Semangat Merdeka, November 17, 20, and 29, 1945.
59. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, p. 40.
60. Aneta I. D. D ., May 31, 1946, pp. 21-22.
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3. We must strive with all strength to avoid a con­
flict with the Indonesians.61
Mr. Hasan and Dr. Amir both noted the friendliness of the Japanese 
in Bukittinggi, who evidently told them on their way home from 
Djakarta that they would transfer all government functions to 
Indonesians. General Tanabe, true to his military type, added,
"In this revolution, make sure the army is well trained and well 
led, and has good spirit."62 At no point did the Japanese in 
Sumatra use force to prevent an assertion of independence in 
Sumatra, except where this involved a serious threat to their own 
security. Instances of draconian Japanese action, notably in 
Tebing Tinggi and Langsa in December, occurred after the Allied 
landings, either as a result of specific Allied directives or as 
pure revenge killing.
Establishing the Republic
The instructions of the PPKI were first revealed to the small 
elite of politicians and administrators prominent during the 
Japanese occupation and grouped together through the various 
Hokokai or their equivalents in each residency. By the end of 
August this group in almost every residency knew either from Amir 
and Hasan or by telegraph that they were expected to form a KNI, 
a PNI, and a paramilitary body. They did not, on the other hand, 
have any guidance from above as to who should take the initiative 
in these ventures or in governing. But where there was an obvious 
nationalist leadership, the Hokokai group transformed itself 
into a KNI (in Atjeh in late August, in West Sumatra on August 30, 
in Palembang on September 3, and in Tapanuli in late September). 
Government continued much as before the surrender, with Japanese 
department heads continuing to come to their offices and fly the 
Japanese flag, though they naturally took little interest in the 
decisions made.
Only in Palembang was there a coherent policy by the elite 
group to take over power from the Japanese. Dr. Gani was one of 
the two fuku-chbkan (deputy-residents) who had taken office during 
the Japanese period of preparation for independence, and he had the 
added advantage of a credibly anti-Japanese image. He acted con­
fidently to form a Pusat Pemerintahan Bangsa Indonesia (Government 
Center of the Indonesian People) on August 23, which obtained 
Japanese recognition as a subordinate authority responsible for 
restraining ethnic Indonesians from clashing with celebrating 
Chinese. From September 6 Gani began encouraging government 
officials to contact him directly, and on September 26, after 
requesting and obtaining authorization from Djakarta, the KNI 
declared Gani resident and asked government officials to cease 
recognizing their Japanese superiors. The following two weeks saw 
the nationalists gradually persuade office staff, by a mixture of 
exhortation and intimidation, to defy their superiors and to force 
them to give up coming to the office.63
61. Interrogation of General Tanabe, I. C. 059351.
62. Interview.
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In Palembang it was militant pemuda who were responsible for 
intimidating senior officials into supporting the Republic during 
the first three nights of October. In other residencies the 
initiative was with the pemuda from the beginning. As one official 
publication rightly acknowledged, "these first months of the revolu­
tion were the pemuda months."®1* Without the pressure they brought 
to bear, a viable Republican government in Sumatra before the Allied 
landings would have been inconceivable.
Benedict Anderson has well defined the special pemuda identity 
at the end*of the Japanese occupation and the effect which Japanese 
models had on them.6® In Sumatra the Japanese had done much less 
than in Java to mobilize youth for the war effort. But there never­
theless existed a well-defined pemuda elite group, old enough to 
have had some prewar secondary education but not to have had a stake 
in the prewar establishment and trained by the Japanese for positions 
of special responsibility in Sumatera Baru. The most important 
component of this group were those who had undergone officer training 
as Giyugun, Heihd, Tokubetsu Keisatsutai (police reserve to guard 
coasts, bridges, etc.), Tokubetsu Hikojo Kinmutai (police reserve 
to guard airfields), and similar organizations. The most important 
of these, the Giyugun or lasjkar rakjat (known as Peta in Java), 
was established in Sumatra in November 1943 as the basis of a 
separate Indonesian army with its own officer corps up to the rank 
of captain. The soldiers were trained and quartered near their 
home districts. The total strength in Sumatra was probably about 
30,000 men at the surrender, although it was proportionately much 
larger in some areas such as Atjeh (5,000-6,000) than in others 
like East Sumatra (1,400). By August 1945 the first few dozen officer 
trainees had reached first lieutenant rank, and a second group second 
lieutenant. As in Java, the combination of intense discipline and 
racial discrimination by the Japanese made these Giyugun officers 
strongly nationalist. Many of them had agreed among themselves that 
in the event of an Allied invasion they would attack the Japanese 
first and deal with the Allies later. In July 1945 Giyugun Lieutenant 
H. Sitompul staged an abortive revolt in the Pematang Siantar barracks.64 56 67
Between the 19th and the 21st of August, before any news of the sur­
render had been made public, all the Giyugun were disarmed and sent 
back to their homes. They were too bewildered to attempt any 
resistance.6 7
The other source of pemuda leadership was the group of educated 
young men associated with Japanese propaganda, news, or communications 
media. They were the first to receive reports of the exciting develop­
ments in Java and became natural centers of the information networks 
which sprang up. In the atmosphere of uncertain expectancy, pemuda 
from the military, the police, and those Japanese offices gathered at
64. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, p. 87.
65. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," pp. 1-35.
66. Kita-Sumatora-sinbun, November 18 and 25, 2603 [1943]; Piekaar, 
Atjhh, pp. 219 and 238; Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera 
Tengah, pp. 79-80. Interviews. Atjeh and West Sumatra were the 
first residencies to provide Giyugun, though the remainder 
followed by early 1944.
67. Modal Revolusi 45, pp. 64-65.
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certain points to exchange what news there was about the Republic 
in Java or the intentions of the Allies. The hostel at Fuzi Dori 
(Djl. Djakarta) 6 in Medan was one example. Rumors of what the 
Dutch intended to do to punish Japanese collaborators gradually 
encouraged a mood of defiance, which was sharpened in street brawls 
with incautiously exuberant Chinese in many towns. During September 
these informal gatherings and information networks were transformed 
into distinct organizations. Toward the end of the month leaflets 
began to be printed advertising the proclamation, and the pemuda 
began to show their impatience with the inactivity of the older 
generation of politicians.68
Medan was an extreme case of a residency capital where no 
clear leader had emerged above the conflicting interest groups 
during the Japanese occupation. Despite their limited contacts 
with left-wing politicians and Taman Siswa teachers, the Medan 
pemuda were handicapped by not even knowing until mid-September 
that Mr. Hasan had been appointed Republican governor. They formed 
their Barisan Pemuda Indonesia (BPI) on September 21 entirely on 
their own initiative. Their mounting determination to resist the 
Allied return found an appropriate focus only when the first post­
war newspaper, Pewarta Deli, appeared on September 29. It repro­
duced an Australian radio report that the Allies had put a police 
guard on Sukarno's home, which in the prevailing mood was taken 
to mean that Sukarno had been arrested and the Republic dissolved.
The pemuda rushed from one leader to another trying to establish 
the truth of the matter, in the course of which they put additional 
pressure on Hasan and the cautious older generation. At a mass 
BPI meeting the following day at the Taman Siswa school the offend­
ing editor, Mohammad Said, was made to apologize for printing a 
provocative report, Hasan spoke about the independence proclamation 
in Djakarta, and pemuda and radical leaders began the public 
campaign for independence. The pemuda urged Hasan to proclaim the 
Republican government on the spot. He stalled discreetly on the 
rather artificial grounds that he carried written authority only 
as a wakil mutlak (plenipotentiary) of Sukarno rather than as 
Republican governor (though the appointment of governors had been 
announced in Djakarta in August). Hasan later telegraphed Djakarta 
for confirmation and received a reply on October 2. Meanwhile 
General Christison's statement of October 1 that the Allies would 
not remove the Republican government must have dispelled what doubts 
the older leaders still felt. Hasan got the support of the leading 
politicians at a meeting on October 2 and began issuing formal state­
ments and decrees the following day.69 One of his first acts was 
to appoint Republican residents who in every case except East 
Sumatra itself were the leaders advanced to prominence during the 
latter part of the Japanese period.70
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Once the pemuda and the older leaders had belatedly found each 
other, Medan could at last begin to function as the Sumatran capital 
it was intended to be. The governors decrees, publicized by the 
official Republican newspaper, Soeloeh Merdeka, beginning October 4, 
were a spur to widespread action. In the remoter residencies his 
telegram appointing a resident was the effective beginning of the 
Republican movement. Where the pemuda were already mobilized, it 
provided a necessary additional legitimation for the cautious older 
generation,. The week between the governor’s taking office and the 
Allied landings was an extremely critical one. Mass rallies were 
held to salute the Merah-Putih, and at one office after another the 
flag was run up and the Japanese head discouraged from attending.
The relationship between the top Indonesians and Japanese in most 
districts was still good, enabling them to ensure in advance that 
there would be no serious violence. The only weapon the Japanese 
attempted to use was bluff, and when the bluff was called, at least 
some Japanese officers appeared genuinely delighted that the 
Indonesians were showing some spirit.71 By the time the 26th 
Indian Division occupied Medan, Padang, and Palembang (October 10-14), 
the government machinery of these three towns was in Republican 
hands, and Republican control in the remaining key areas was well 
on the way to being established (in Atjeh by October 14 and in 
Tapanuli by October 17). Republican strength in some areas had yet 
to be tested in relation to that of the Allies and of the separate 
bureaucracies operated by the generally pro-Dutch keradjaan. But 
it was a great victory that the central bureaucracies formerly 
under Japanese direct control were now taking orders from Republican 
leaders.
The same critical week saw a rationalization of the pemuda move­
ment in most areas. In response to early Republican policy to form 
a BKR (from October 5 known as TKR--Tentara Keamanan Rakjat) as an 
armed force built primarily from Japanese-trained units, the pemuda 
groups split. Those with formal military training formed a TKR 
division in each residency, usually accepting a fair degree of con­
trol from the local Republican officials. The remaining civilians 
rapidly declared themselves part of an Indonesia-wide youth movement 
and adopted the names which had already become famous in Java. The 
Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (API) of Djakarta was copied in Lampung 
and Djambi and by some pemuda in Palembang. Throughout West and 
North Sumatra the accepted title was Pemuda Republik Indonesia (PRI), 
like that of the then dominant pemuda group in Surabaja. All of 
these Sumatran organizations dutifully declared themselves branches 
of Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) following the merging of the 
Java API and PRI into that new group at the Youth Congress in 
Jogjakarta on November 9. In reality the Sumatran pemuda groups 
had little in common with the API/PRI/Pesindo element in Java. The 
network of anti-Japanese contacts organized by Sjahrir during the 
war among educated youth had not extended outside Java. Virtually 
unrepresented in Sumatra was the strongly anti-collaborationist 
youth, which, with a hard core of students rallying specifically 
behind the Sjahrir-Sjarifuddin leadership, was the most vital element 
of Javanese politics in the first six months of independence. The 
essence of API/PRI/Pesindo in Sumatra was not a link with any of the
71. See especially Hussain, Peristiwa, p. 71.
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rival Djakarta politicians in particular but a desire to embrace 
all youth in a common struggle, to reject the regional groupings 
of the past, and to stress as emphatically as possible a new pan- 
Indonesian pemuda identity. Changes in the titles of these groups 
were usually announced proudly with the words Mon instructions 
from Java." Only Palembang was out of step with this trend. There 
the influence of Dr. Gani predominated in the early BPRI group 
which he was able to fashion later into Napindo, the powerful youth 
wing of the Sumatra PNI, without parallel in Java.72
Both the TKR and the PRI/API groups quickly organized along 
military lines and attempted to gather all possible arms from the 
Japanese. But whereas the TKR was relatively cohesive and respon­
sive to official control, the civilian pemuda movement became a 
loose federation of fighting gangs, often competing for control of 
territory. Though individual members of the older political elite 
had varying degrees of influence over these gangs, the Republican 
leaders could not rely on their support during internal crises.
The balance of power between the TKR and the PRI/API varied 
considerably from one residency to another. In Atjeh, Tapanuli, 
and Palembang a significant concentration of Giyugun and early 
backing from the resident made the TKR relatively strong, though 
not in a position to dictate. The Republic was especially fortunate 
in Palembang because the resident also had a personal following 
among the civilian pemuda. At the other extreme the East Sumatra 
TKR was just one of many fighting organizations and weaker than 
PRI/Pesindo as a whole.
The violent phase of the revolution in Sumatra began immedi­
ately after the Allied landings in October, when the pemuda 
clashed with Dutch ex-prisoners, Ambonese, Japanese, and eventually 
with Allied troops themselves. This phase is outside the scope 
of this article. Yet already by early October many of the essential 
features of the revolution on Sumatra were becoming clear. In 
comparison with Java, the central fact about Sumatra was the weak­
ness of the Republican leadership. It was much less able to 
assert its authority over, or prevent internecine fighting among, 
those who had the guns and felt themselves, with reason, to be the 
vanguard of the revolution. Despite great variation among 
residencies, with the South approaching Javanese conditions most 
closely, it would be a fair generalization to say that the level 
of intra-Indonesian violence was considerably higher in Sumatra 
during the early revolution. In particular the social revolution 
which affected Sumatra much more profoundly than Java in late 1945 
and early 1946 was beyond the power of the Republican authorities 
to prevent or control. Even more than in Java, the revolution was 
made and the pace was set by pemuda with a rather low estimate of 
officialdom.
The Question of Sumatran Political Identity
Only once in history has the island of Sumatra had a meaning­
ful legal and political identity. Its evenly-balanced major
72. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, pp. 542-549; 
Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatera SelaTan, pp. 49-50.
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communities--Minangkabau, Batak, Atjehnese, and Palembang--were 
brought together only by the wider authority of Batavia/Djakarta.
But for precisely a decade, 1938-1948, successive Dutch, Japanese, 
and Republican authorities did choose to treat the island as an 
administrative unit. One of the avowed reasons the Dutch established 
a governor of Sumatra in Medan was "the awareness of a Sumatran unity, 
already germinally present and to be further developed by the estab­
lishment of one [Sumatran] Province."73 745 This was a thoroughly 
artificial and unsuccessful attempt to divert the Indonesian popular 
movement into regional channels. Its major importance was as an 
example for later Republicans and a training ground for officials 
such as Mr. Hasan.
The complete and effective separation from Java under the 
Japanese brought a quite new situation. For three years propaganda 
had been directed primarily toward building Sumatera Baru. The 
Japanese 25th Army undoubtedly had the opportunity to exploit and 
encourage whatever Sumatran sentiments existed by building up a 
distinct Sumatran leadership. Fortunately for Republican unity, 
the Japanese were not interested in building any leadership whatever 
until their last two months of power, and even then to a very limited 
degree. Nevertheless it is not surprising that the Japanese period 
did encourage some leaders to think that an autonomous Sumatra was 
a practicable ideal. Most affected were the small elite old enough 
to have been members of Jong Sumatra together during their student 
days in the 1920fs and filling prominent positions under the Japanese. 
For the more conservative aristocratic leaders this was primarily 
a negative rejection of Java as the source of political extremism 
and Islamic heresy. There were, however, genuine Republicans for 
whom Sumatra had a positive meaning. The majority of these seem 
to have been Minangkabau, particularly Minangkabau living in other 
parts of Sumatra than their homeland. The most outspoken example 
was Dr. Amir, one of the most eloquent defenders of the cultural 
unity of Sumatera Baru during the war years.7h As deputy-governor 
of Sumatra from December 1945 he remained anxious to build up a 
highly autonomous government apparatus in Medan. After his aliena­
tion from the Republic the following April, he made Javanese domina­
tion the central theme of his criticism.
Up till now this unitary question has not been publicly 
discussed. We three, who attended the meeting of the 
Committee for the Preparation of Independence in 
Djakarta in August 1945, hoped that Sumatra would 
obtain autonomy concerning external and internal 
affairs outside the Republic, but we were admonished 
not to form a separate state with its own depart­
ments , etc.7 5
73. S. van der Harst, Overzicht van de bestuurshervorming in de 
Buitengewesten van Nederlandsch-Indig, in het bijzonder op 
Sumatra (Utrecht: A. Oosthoek, 1945), p. 46.
74. E. g. Kita-Sumatora-sinbun, June 27, 2605 [1945].
75. Dr. Amir, "Nieuw Sumatra," De Opdracht, October 1946, p. 9. After 
the transfer of sovereignty Mohammad Sjafei also became one of the 
leading critics of Javanese centralism; G. S. Maryanov, Decentral­
ization in Indonesia as a Political Problem (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project , 195 8) , p . 41’.
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Amir and the other members of Hasan's "cabinet," despite 
frequent protestations of solidarity with Java, did make their 
own decisions on most issues without consulting Djakarta at least 
until Amir Sjarifuddin's visit. Had they been stronger as a 
group, they would very probably have resisted the gradual erosion 
of their autonomy thereafter by the central government. But it 
was the pemuda who had made the Republic possible in Sumatra and 
who retained physical power. For the pemuda unity with Java was 
all important. Java was the heroic model for struggle, showing 
the way to liberation from the otherwise certain Dutch restora­
tion .7 6
The Dutch, in adopting their postwar federal strategy were 
counting on the ethnic and regional sentiments of the older gen­
eration. they knew so well. The logical superstructure for the 
Negara (member states) they later sponsored in Sumatra was an all- 
Sumatra grouping, to balance against Java and East Indonesia. But 
quite apart from its unacceptability as part of Dutch colonial 
strategy, the Sumatran idea was found to have no appeal in South 
Sumatra and little for the highly autonomous Atjehnese and Batak.76 7 
The Muktamar Sumatra sponsored by the federalists in March-April 
1949 was a predictable flop. The brief moment for Sumatran unity 
had passed, and Dutch pressure was unlikely to succeed in reviving 
it.
76. The most striking indication of the strength of the popular, 
pemuda-inspired desire to follow Java was the experience of 
Atjeh. Before the war it still resembled a conquered country 
rather than a part of the Netherlands Indies body politic.
The leadership of the dominant popular force, PUSA, indisputably 
thought in Atjehnese and Islamic rather than Indonesian terms. 
Yet even PUSA needed the Republican enthusiasm of the pemuda 
to escape a restoration of Dutch and ulbSbalang rule. In the 
first year of the revolution Atjeh was a model of outward 
loyalty to the central government.
77. Directeur-Generaal voor Algemene Zaken to Lt. Gouverneur- 
Generaal, February 27, 1947 (Bundle 22/6 in the postwar 
Indonesian archive in The Hague).
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Members of Sumatra Central Advisory 
Council (Chuo Sangi In)
APPENDIX I
I have roughly categorized representatives of Islamic movements 
by (I), of political movements by (P), and of the keradjaan, some of 
whom were also moderate nationalists, by (K). Most of those not 
fitting into such categories were Japanese-appointed officials with 
no particular following. In Tapanuli the antagonism between Christian 
North and Muslim South took precedence over any other distinctions.
At j eh
Elected: T. Njak Arif (K), Chairman, Atjeh Council
Tgk. Mohd. Daud Beureu'eh (I), Chairman of PUSA
Appointed: T. Tjut Hasan (K), Vice-Chairman Atjeh Council
T.P.P. Mohd. Ali (K), Panglima Sagi XXII Mukim 
Tgk. Mohd. Hasbi (I), Deputy Chairman of Maibkatra, and 
Muhammadiah leader
East Sumatra
Elected: Djamaluddin Adinegoro (P), Editor Kita-Sumatora-siribun
and Vice-Chairman East Sumatra Council (resigned seat 
after election)
Tgk. Damrah (K), Serdang royal family
Appointed: Tgk. Othman (K), Crown Prince of Deli
Radja Kaliamsjah Sinaga (K), Radja Pg. Tanah Djawa 
Dr. R. Pirngadi (P), prewar Parindra leader 
Hamka (I), Consul Muhammadiah Sumatra Timur 
Hsu Hua Chang (Chinese), Chairman of Medan Hohkiaw
Tapanuli
Elected: Dr. Ferdinand Lumbantobing (North), Chairman Tapanuli
Council
Firman Rangkuti gelar St. Soripada Mulia (South)
Appointed: Radja Saul Lumbantobing (North)
Hadji A. Aziz (South)
West Sumatra
Elected: Mohd. Sjafei (P), Chairman W. Sumatra Council
Chatib Suleiman (P), Vice-Chairman W. Sumatra Council
Appointed: Datuk Perpatih Baringek (K), leader of adat organization
A.R. Sutan Mansur (I), Consul Muhammadiah W. Sumatra 
Dr. Mohd. Djamil
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Riau*
Elected: Aminoedin (P), Chairman Riau Council
Appointed: Orang Kaja Mohd. Djamil (K), relative of Sultan of Siak 
Sjamsoeddin, guncho (district officer)
Dj ambi 
Elected: Abdoel Manan, Chairman Djambi Council
Appointed: Abdoel Katab
Makalam, Vice-Chairman Djambi Council
Palembang 
Elected: Dr. A.K. Gani (P), Chairman Palembang Council and 
prewar Gerindo leader 
Abdoel Rozak (P)
Appointed: Tjik Mat (P)
Kiai Hadji Tjik Wan (I)
Ir. Ibrahim (P), Vice-Chairman Palembang Council
Bengkulen 
Elected: Abdoellah
Appointed: Ir. Indra Tjahaja, Chairman Bengkulen Council 
Mohd. Jasin
Lampung 
Elected: Radja Pagar Alam (K)
Appointed: Mr. Abdul Abbas (P), Chairman Lampung Council
St. Rahim Pasaman, Head of Bureau of Popular Petitions
(Koseikyokucho)
Bangka-Billiton
Elected: M. A. Sjarif (P), Chairman Bangka-Billiton Council
Appointed: Oen Lam Seng (Chinese), Vice-Chairman Bangka-Billiton 
Council* *
* Mainland Sumatra only; the archipelago was united with Singapore
** Sources: Kita-Sumatora-sinbun, June 27, 1945; Atjeh Sinbun,
May 19, 19JT.
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Members of Panitia Penjelidik Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan (Sumatra)3
APPENDIX II
Chairman: Mohd. Sjafei Secretary: Djamaluddin Adinegoro
Members
Atjeh: T. Njak Arif
Tgk. Mohd. Daud Beureufeh
East Sumatra: Dr. Pirngadi
Dr. Amir
Mr. T. Mohd. Hasan 
Hamka
Tgk. Saibun Abdul Jalil Rahmat Sjah, Sultan of Asahan 
Hsu Hua Chang
Tapanuli: Dr. Ferdinand Lumbantobing 
Mr. Azairin
West Sumatra: Dt. Perpatih Baringek
A. R. Sutan Mansur
Chatib Soeleiman
Sjech Mohd. Djamil Djambek
Riau: Aminoeddin
Dj ambi: 
Bengkulen: 
Palembang:
Lampung:
Dr. A. Sjagoff
Ir. Indra Tjahaja
Dr. A. K. Gani 
Ir. Ibrahim 
K. H. Tjik Wan
Mr. Abdul Abbas
Bangka-Billiton: M. A. Sjarif
3. Source: Atjeh Sinbun, July 28, 1945.
APPENDIX III -p *cr\
First Republican Residents in Sumatra
Residency Resident
Position during Japanese 
Occupation Served until
At j eh Teuku Njak Arif Chairman, Atjeh Council and 
adviser to chokan
January 21, 1946
East Sumatra Mr. Mohd. Joesoef Assistant to Japanese mayor 
of Medan
October 29, 1945 
(to become mayor 
of Medan)
Tapanuli Dr. Ferdinand 
Lumbantobing
Chairman, Tapanuli Council 
and Hokokai, and fuku- 
chdkan
September 1947
West Sumatra Mohd. Sjafei Chairman, W. Sumatra 
Council and Hokokai, and 
Chuo Sangi In.
November 15, 1945 
(on grounds of 
"illness")
Dj ambi Dr. A. Sjagoff Member PPPK (Sumatra) December 1945 
(arrested by 
Japanese)
Riau Aminoeddin Chairman, Riau Council October 1945 (at 
request of KNI)
Bengkulen Ir. Indra Tjahaja Chairman, Bengkulen 
Council
May 1946 (at re­
quest of KNI)
Palembang Dr. A. K. Gani Chairman, Palembang Council 
and Hokokai, and fuku- 
chokan
May 1946 (to be­
come vice- 
governor)
Lampung Mr. A. Abbas Chairman, Lampung Council 
and Hokokai
September 1946 
("daulat"ed by 
pemuda)
Bangka-Billiton M. A. Sjarif Chairman, Bangka-Billiton 
Council
February 1946 
(Dutch occupation)
